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Abstract. Th is article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive 
outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus 
on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various 
ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-
action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like 
qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic 
sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the 
means to track at which level of complexity semiosis fi nds itself, in a given case. Since 
the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing un-
interpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies 
are largely misplaced.
Keywords: semiotics, metaphysics, Charles Peirce, modality, possibility, actuality, 
generality, trinitarianism, prescission, taxonomy, relations, Karl Popper, inference
Th e student of Aristotle usually begins with the Categories; and the fi rst thing that 
strikes him is the author’s unconsciousness of any distinction between grammar 
and metaphysics, between modes of signifying and modes of being. When he 
comes to the metaphysical books, he fi nds that this is not so much an oversight as 
an assumed axiom [...]. (CP 2.384)
I would say, actually it is fi ne to derive one’s metaphysics from one’s semantics – 
just please, please get a less simplistic semantics! (Legg 2013: 16)
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1. Introduction
Th ere is a sense in which one can use signs without granting their reality, just as 
one can breathe without accepting the reality of air. But, if one does not endorse a 
metaphysical outlook explicitly, an uncritical view will simply fi ll the void (Lowe 
2014: 128–130). Unfortunately, despite this inevitability, no one really knows how to 
adjudicate metaphysical disagreements. Parsimony – the aspiration to posit as little 
as possible – is a widely-cited desideratum, but it is unclear what counts as more 
parsimonious. David Chalmers (2013: 18), for instance, writes that “[a]ccording to 
Russellian monism, all conscious experience is grounded in structure plus quiddities, 
but not in structure alone”. I happen to agree with this. Yet, if there is a commitment 
to something “plus” something else, how can this be “monism”? 
One method, prominent in analytic metaphysics since at least Quine (2001[1953]: 
1–19), consists in looking at what (some) people talk about, then cataloguing what has 
to exist in order for that talk to make sense. Of course, we have to begin somewhere, 
but why should we begin with language? And which language should we pick, exactly? 
Quine and his followers held that “if we could imagine our science collated and 
regularized into a single theory expressed in fi rst-order logic, its bound variables 
would have values” (Legg 2013: 3) that would pick out what is real. Like Legg, I fi nd 
this overly simplistic. Th e strategy will certainly succeed in capturing some of “what 
there is”, but I see no reason why it would capture all there is.
With Charles S. Peirce (2015: 681), I am compelled to recognize that “[t]here are 
countless Objects of Consciousness that words cannot express”. Verbal descriptions, 
for instance, arguably fail to convey fully what it is like to experience an orgasm 
(Champagne in press b). So, instead of looking at language for my clue, I propose to 
derive a metaphysical outlook from sign-action in the broadest sense.
Like most Peircean semioticians, I think we can analyse signs into three discernible 
parts. Pursuant with this, I will explore the idea that reality is comprised of three 
stuff s: lone quality, causal impacts between two things, and triadic relations (that 
have the power to beget more of themselves). Following Bradley (2009), I propose 
to call this trinitarianism. On a trinitarian ontology, everything is made of one or 
more of the sign’s three parts.1 I suppose I could say that there is only one thing in 
the world, semiosis, and that it has three “properties”, namely Firstness, Secondness, 
and Th irdness. However, there may be genuine ontological commitments involved, 
and I want to see what happens when those are embraced head-on. My hunch is that, 
when it is presented in a charitable light, a sign-based worldview turns out not to be 
spooky at all.
1 I could have also named this view ‘semiotic trinitarianism’, to distinguish it from religious 
versions (like Polkinghorne 2003; Robinson 2010).
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My eff ort can be glossed a number of ways. It is partly pedagogical: I am out to 
explain some key Peircean ideas to an audience that may not have a prior familiarity 
with (or sympathy towards) those ideas. It is partly promotional: I believe that 
mainstream debates in metaphysics would benefi t from considering semiotic theory. 
It is partly corrective: I fi nd that discussions in semiotics sometimes carelessly endorse 
(or fl irt with) misguided ideas, so I want to do my best to fl ag some notable dead-
ends. It is partly synthetic: I have been thinking about these issues for a while now, 
so I want to pause and unite my ideas in a comprehensive worldview. One thing my 
eff ort is not, however, is exegetical: I am not out to woo or outdo established Peirce 
scholarship. I am schooled in the relevant literature and stand by everything I say, but 
there are plenty of sources that will satisfy exegetical cravings better than this article.
Here is how I intend to proceed. I will begin by retracing the motivation behind 
the endorsement of three stuff s (Section 2). I will then contrast this triple commitment 
with Karl Popper’s three “worlds” (Section 3). Instead of positing worlds, I will use 
a modal principle to partition diff erent layers: regular sign-action subsumes actual 
sign-action which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (Section 4). As we will see, 
these basic layers can be recursively compounded in a way that does justice to a whole 
range of experiences. Aft er breaking the action of signs down into such discernible 
steps, I will look at salient examples (Section 5). I will discuss the pros and cons of 
ranking signs in an ascending or descending order (Section 6). Finally, I will draw 
on the foregoing to show how the bulk of a Peirce-inspired metaphysics is devoted to 
countenancing un-interpreted phenomena (Section 7).
2. Why three stuff s?
My second epigraph calls for a less simplistic “semantics”. Semantics is sometimes 
defi ned (when it is defi ned at all) as the study of meaning apart from use (see Palmer 
1997: 1–8). Linguists have been trying to do semantics since at least Michel Bréal’s 1897 
Essai de sémantique. In philosophy, the logician Alfred Tarski used the term in a 1936 
paper titled “Grundlegung der wissenschaft lichen Semantik”. Two years later, Charles 
W. Morris published his infl uential Foundations of the Th eory of Signs (reprinted in 
Morris 1971: 13–71). In that short paper, Morris cut semiotics into three branches: 
“semantics” (studying vehicle-to-object relations), “syntactics” (studying vehicle-to-
vehicle relations), and “pragmatics” (studying vehicle-to-interpreter relations).
Rudolf Carnap, who was infl uenced by both Morris and Tarski, was among the 
fi rst analytic philosophers to describe prominently his investigations as “semantic” 
(see Hanzel 2009). Yet this aspiration to study one relation in isolation is highly 
questionable. Indeed, one could argue that vehicle-to-interpreter relations matter only 
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because interpreters take it that there are vehicle-to-object relations (what interest 
could any interpreter possibly have in a mere vehicle?). Likewise, one can wonder 
how, without vehicle-to-interpreter relations and vehicle-to-object relations, one can 
be in any position to distinguish between vehicle-to-vehicle and mere thing-to-thing 
relations. What, for example, distinguishes a string of beads in an abacus from a string 
of pearls in a necklace? It seems that, without “semantic” value and “pragmatic” use, 
we have no justifi able basis to think that one string (the abacus) has syntax while the 
other (the pearl necklace) lacks syntax.
Despite these problems, the isolated study of semantics is now so entrenched 
in philosophy and linguistics that reintroducing the unifi ed notion of semiosis is 
considered a radical move (see Rellstab 2010). Analytic philosophers of language have 
artifi cially divided a phenomenon into simpler parts, but are now unable to fi nd their 
way back. To his credit, Morris (1971: 23) warned that “the various dimensions” picked 
out by his trivium of disciplines “are only aspects of a unitary process”. Popularity, 
however, has a way of putting statements on a severe diet.
Morris claimed to be continuing the work of Peirce (Rochberg-Halton, McMurtrey 
1983), but “[t]he term [semantics] is not one found anywhere in Peirce; for pragmaticism, 
the fi eld it is supposed to demarcate, simply does not and cannot exist” (Tejera 1991: 
151). Th is impossibility stems from the fact that, unlike the branches proposed by 
Morris, signs are three-term relations that cannot be reduced to conjunctions of pairs. 
As a logician trained in framing things in the broadest terms possible, Peirce (CP 
1.339) showed how any sign is something that stands for something to something – 
regardless of what might fi ll these place-holders on a given occasion.2 I will refi ne this 
considerably in subsequent sections. For now, what matters is that this triadic model 
imposes a very strong constraint: delete any component in the triad and the action 
proper to signs ceases.
To see why, imagine that a person and a text are placed near each other, so that the 
person could in principle view the text. How confi dent would we be that the person 
read what was written if the person in question had no reaction whatsoever to the 
exposure? I mean this literally: no utterance, no eye tracking, no increased palm 
moisture, and no altered brain state – no alteration at all. With no eff ect, how would 
we regard the claim “Th e person has interpreted the sign-vehicle before her”? It seems 
that, under such circumstances, such a claim would be completely unwarranted. At 
minimum, then, interpretation demands that something happen. It does not have to 
be much; a quick glance in the direction of the text, for example, would give the claim 
of interpretation renewed weight/plausibility. Still, if bringing two things together 
2 Additionally, Peirce argued that all complex relations can be reduced to three-term 
relations. His demonstrations, which belong to a branch of geometry called topology, are laid 
out in Peirce 1998: 364.
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results in nothing more than bringing together two things, we have no reason to gloss 
the proximity as interpretive.3
Peirce uses ‘interpretant’ to name the eff ect produced when a sign-vehicle is linked 
to an object. ‘Interpretant’ is a rigorously defi ned term-of-art in semiotic theory, so it 
should not be confused with the lay notion of interpreter. Just as we replace the lay term 
‘sign’ by the more appropriate term ‘sign-vehicle’ to pick out a material thing based on 
the semiotic role it plays, so we replace ‘interpreter’ by ‘interpretant’ when we want 
to pick out the semiotic role it plays (diff erent roles, diff erent names). Nevertheless, 
as shown by the common etymology, the two notions are not completely unrelated:
Now, the conception that Peirce takes to be the ordinary, unrefl ected idea of 
sign and sign-process is that the activity of signs [...] involves an utterer and an 
interpreter. Such a view may seem to be almost opposite to Peirce’s generalized 
conceptions of sign and semiosis. But, in fact, Peirce considers this crude idea to 
contain the seed of truth. [...] Peirce’s aim is to abstract those ingredients of utterer 
and interpreter that are vital to the being of a sign. (Bergman 2003: 11)
If we ask what gives interpreters their unique ability to bring about meaningful 
relations, we have a lot of possible explanations: it might be because of their livers, 
or their brains, or the fact that their bodies contain sodium. Yet, such answers are 
about as promising as thinking that ink or paint is what makes a sign-vehicle capable 
of signifying. In either case, a functional defi nition is in order. Hence, looking at 
everyday interpreters, Peirce was able to discern a very specifi c relation: “Such a 
mediating representation may be termed an interpretant, because it fulfi ls the offi  ce 
of an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he himself says” 
(Peirce 1992: 5).
Consider a United Nations interpreter paid to mediate between French and English 
diplomats. Th is bilingual interpreter is a regular person, liver and all. Yet, the semiotic 
function that she fulfi ls is not visible in the same sense. To be an interpreter, one 
must relate things. In the present case, a French diplomat speaks, then the bilingual 
interpreter, having listened, speaks in English. Of course, nothing prevents the U. N. 
worker from temporarily suspending her vocation and saying whatever she wants to 
her English interlocutor. Were she to do this, though, she would no longer be relating 
3 Might the person in my example eventually react to the text in some fashion? Certainly; 
in that sense, the situation allows for a host of potential responses. Th is potential, however, 
is confi rmed only by acts. If those acts are regular/habitual, then all the better. In fact, for 
an occurrence to count as linguistic, the reactions have to be regular/habitual. One cannot 
be credited with knowing Japanese just because on a single occasion one randomly uttered 
a Japanese-sounding word (which is why, as we shall later see, Peircean semiotics requires a 
symbol to have a regular type as its vehicle).
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her utterances to the French utterances in a way that entitle the former to count as 
interpretations of the latter. Hence, a specifi c relation must be satisfi ed: the interpreter 
conveyed to the English diplomat what the French diplomat herself conveyed, thereby 
giving the English a mediated access to the French that the English would not have 
otherwise had.
Although the role of the interpretant is similar to that of the interpreter who acts 
as a “middle-man” between two parties (Savan 1987: 43–48), it is being in the middle 
that counts, not being a man. As such, “the notion of sign [...] has been constructed 
as conceptually independent of particular situations” (Bouissac 2000: 19). Th is lets 
semiotics study a host of situations (Deely et al. 1986). If, for example, a squid – call it 
squid A – sees an approaching predator and thereby secretes ink, this ink can in turn 
act as a sign-vehicle to another squid B, whose interpretant will also be to fl ee. Add 
another squid C which fl ees upon seeing the fl ight of squid B and the fl ight that was 
an interpretant in the original triad now counts as a sign-vehicle in the newer triad. 
Th e relation is the same as the U. N. diplomat case: B conveyed to C what A itself 
conveyed, thereby giving C a mediated access to A that C would not have otherwise 
had. Peirce’s categories of First, Second, and Th ird are meant to help us track the 
role-switching that allows information to be passed along in this relay race (that can 
pause but can never stop, once and for all).4
Th e familiar secretion which prompts an about face in squid B cannot by itself 
account for that squid’s aversive response. Studying the chemical properties of the 
sign-vehicle won’t help; we must recognize that the ink acted as a sign. If one refuses 
to see that squid B fl ees a predator (and not a cloud of ink), one is going to miss out on 
what is really going on. Squid B may never see the predator itself – that is the whole 
point (and evolutionary utility) of an anticipatory fl ight. Yet, working together, these 
signs at sea can connect distant objects, “[f]or to be in a relation to X, and to be in a 
relation to a relation to X, mean the same thing” (Peirce, MS 611, quoted in Stjernfelt 
2014: 87).5 Th e static idea of ‘semantics’ occludes these important features.
John Dewey studied briefl y under Peirce at Johns Hopkins University. Compared 
with Morris, Dewey had a far clearer grasp of what the founder of pragmatism meant 
by meaning, so the passages where Dewey corrected Morris are instructive:
Peirce uniformly holds (1) that there is no such thing as a sign in isolation, every 
sign being a constituent of a sequential set of signs, so that apart from membership 
in this set, a thing has no meaning – or is not a sign; and (2) that in the sequential 
movement of signs thus ordered, the meaning of the earlier ones in the series 
4 For another example using marmots, sunfl owers, and who knows what else, see Champagne 
2009b: 159.
5 Smartphones, for example, put us in touch with one another across vast distances partly 
because they go from, say, English to strings of 0s and 1s and back to English.
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is provided by or constituted by the later ones as their interpretants, until a 
conclusion (logical as a matter of course) is reached. Indeed, Peirce adheres so 
consistently to this view that he says, more than once, that signs, as such, form an 
infi nite series, so that no conclusion of reasoning is forever fi nal, being inherently 
open to having its meaning modifi ed by further signs. (Dewey 1946: 88)6
Scholars and scientists oft en sense that something like semiosis happens, but they 
sometimes couch their intuitions in anthropomorphic analogies that invite offi  cial 
disavowals. Th e neuroscientist Bernard Baars, for example, writes that “[i]f we could 
zoom in on one individual neuron [...] we would see the nerve cell communicating 
frantically to its neighbors about one thousand times per second [...]” (Baars 1997: 
18; emphasis added). Frederik Stjernfelt (in Emmeche et al. 2008: 7) observes that, 
promissory notes aside, such terminology is never reduced or eliminated. A trinitarian 
would argue that such reductions or eliminations are never carried out because, 
fundamentally, the action of signs is a genuine part of reality.
If, say, neuron A impinges on neuron B, and neuron B impinges on neuron C, then 
no matter how we unpack the impingement, we cannot credit these two events with 
any kind of informational transfer unless neuron C is aff ected in a way that makes 
it relate to neuron A through the intermediary of neuron B.7 In this sense, we have 
action at a distance. Th is is what Peirce (1998: 411) meant by semiosis, namely “an 
action, or infl uence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a 
sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative infl uence not being in any way 
resolvable into actions between pairs”.8
Like rubber-bands layered atop one another until they form a ball-shape, signs 
can be added to signs even though the inner-most rubber band that started it all 
is coiled unto nothing but itself. Indeed, “as any teacher can well attest, the object 
communicated need by no means have a physical presence to the communicants even 
when and if it has a physical presence elsewhere, for it need not have or have ever 
had a physical presence at all [...]” (Deely 2015: 10). Th is is what happens when an 
error or a fi ction spreads. If, for example, squid A would have secreted its ink merely 
because of a malfunctioning organ, squid B would still have fl ed, even in the absence 
of a real predator, and that fl ight would still have made squid C fl ee too. Hence, 
6 For a compact justifi cation of this view, see Peirce 1992: 11–27.
7 Fred Dretske (1981) has done a great job showing how information theory can be used 
to craft  a persuasive account. Unfortunately, Dretske (1995) also thinks we should try to 
“naturalize” the mind in a way that makes the idea of qualitative experience dubious (see 
Bailey 2005). I do not see why this incredulity should follow. On the contrary, as I will argue in 
Section 5, I think the triadic account implies a qualitative limit case where A stands for A to A.
8 Contrast this with the account of (effi  cient) causality given in Bunge 2008.
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erroneous or not, the basic structure of meaning propagation stays the same.9 Analytic 
philosophers tend to fi xate on truth, reducing all in absentia discourse to moments of 
direct “acquaintance” (Russell 1910–1911), but the agnosticism or alethic neutrality of 
semiosis is what enables coral reefs of the imagination like literature. We write/read 
something we know to be untrue, yet pass it along nonetheless.
Because that action of signs traverses nature and culture, the study of signs permits/
demands a unifi ed view of the natural and social sciences (Deely 2009b; Sebeok 2000). 
A prevalent picture, however, asks us to stack all disciplines according to the size or 
scale of their subject matters: cultural phenomena are supposed to be reducible to 
neurological facts, which are supposed to be reducible to chemical and, eventually, 
to physical facts. Th is vertical arrangement, canonically expressed by Oppenheim 
and Putnam (1958: 9), has mired many disciplines in physics-envy and neuromania. 
However, I reject the dubious metaphysical thesis that, the smaller a thing is, the more 
real it is. So, when I advocate a “layered” ontology, I do not mean this. A researcher 
may spend her time looking at microscopes (e.g., El-Hani et al. 2006) or shopping 
malls (e.g., Danesi 2006), but such personal predilections do not mean that a given 
venue is where “real” signs reside.
Despite the continued prevalence of reductionism – even in semiotics10 – the fact is 
that “over more than forty years since its publication, the specifi c extrapolations off ered 
by [Oppenheim and Putnam] seem to have been, without exception, mistaken” (Ross 
2005: 168). Having changed his views in light of these failings, Putnam (2015: 313) is 
now trying to rehabilitate “philosophical positions that are ‘naturalist’ in the sense [...] 
9 Jesper Hoff meyer (2014: 14) has recently argued that, because de-cerebrated rats can still 
lift  their hind leg when approaching a spot where they had previously received electric shocks, 
the brain is not needed for sign-action to take place. As a point about the stinging object not 
needing to be present, I fi nd this argument persuasive. Now, I presume that a headless rat is a 
dead rat. Since Hoff meyer is granting that semiosis can occur even without life, he now needs 
to tell us what, if anything, distinguishes a dead rat’s convulsing body from, say, an elastic 
material that has become tougher as a result of prior kneading. Peirce embraced this with his 
broad notion of ‘habit’, but I doubt Hoff meyer would follow him. Hoff meyer might respond 
that some cells in a dead rat are still “alive”, but letting semiosis make do without brains or 
regular organismic life is a big concession (bigger, I think, than Hoff meyer currently realizes).
10 Th e manifesto by Anderson et al. (1984) struggles against the centripetal pull of this picture 
while undermining that very struggle with prefi xes like “microsemiotic”, “macrosemiotic”, 
“quantumsemiotic”, and “megasemiotic” (Anderson et al. 1984: 13). Luckily, none of those 
neologisms have caught on – although one recent paper dazzled by scale managed to 
confuse the natural sign of boiling water for an alleged “chemiosemiosis” (see the critique in 
Champagne 2013b). I fi nd it absurd to think that, were I to shrink to a minuscule size and write 
graffi  ti on a cell wall, my antics would suddenly become the province of “biosemioticians” 
instead of “sociosemioticians” (and that, were I to shrink even further, the baton would pass to 
“chemiosemioticians”).
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of rejecting all appeals to supernatural entities in philosophy while simultaneously 
rejecting the positivist demand that aesthetic and ethical concepts be reduced to the 
concepts of the natural sciences or expecting that they could, or eventually will be, so 
reduced”. I do not cling to (or wish to rescue) the label “naturalism”, but I join Putnam 
in this important task.11
Since I want to acknowledge the very signs I rely on in order to defend my view 
of the world, I propose to countenance semiotic triads – plus all the simpler (dyadic 
and monadic) states that they subsume.
3. Peirce’s three categories versus Popper’s three “worlds”
Maybe I lack erudition, but I know of only one major contemporary thinker besides 
Peirce who countenanced three stuff s, and that is Karl Popper. Popper is mainly known 
for the view that science advances by means of conjectures and refutations (Popper 
2002[1963]), but he eventually felt it necessary to clarify the ontology that makes this 
cut-and-parry binding and predictive. Although Popper did not read Peirce prior 
to 1966 (Chauviré 2005: 209), the subsequent eff ects of his reading quickly became 
noticeable,12 so the case can be made that his three worlds were loosely inspired by the 
Peircean categories. Popper (1955) was concerned with the mainstream mind-body 
problem, but given that “we fi nd in Peirce no traditional philosophical arrangement 
that creates a mind-body problem” (Pietarinen 2006: 76), something was lost in 
translation. Even so, the ideas of Popper can serve as a convenient foil to introduce 
the distinctive ontological commitments of trinitarianism.
As a philosopher of science, Popper did not want to deny the mind-independent 
existence of matter. He did, however, think that an exclusively material world would 
be insuffi  cient to house consciousness and knowledge. In short, Popper wanted to 
put scientists in his scientifi c worldview. He thus strove to account for what he called 
“knowledge in the objective sense, which consists of the logical content of our theories 
conjectures, and guesses” (Popper 1979: 73). Examples of such knowledge would be 
“theories published in journals and books and stored in libraries” (Popper 1979: 
73).13 Note that the “objective” items here are not paper sheets, but rather the abstract 
theories that reside in (and, when interpreted, are transmitted by) token sign-vehicles 
11 For a detailed story about normativity that counts as “naturalist” in the liberal sense 
outlined by Putnam, see Champagne 2011.
12 Popper considered Peirce to be “one of the greatest philosophers of all time” (Popper 1979: 
212) and praised him for espousing indeterminism in physics (Popper 1979: 213, 296; Popper, 
Eccles 1981: 22–23).
13 Because Popper took seriously the semiotic artefacts used by scientists, his work briefl y 
attracted the attention of Th omas Sebeok (1979: 204–205).
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(see Skagestad 1999: 555–557). Th is suggests that a commitment to physics needs to 
be augmented with something that can track the fl ow of information. In keeping 
with this, Popper locates physical facts in what he calls “world 1”. Popper describes 
“world 2” as “the world of our conscious experiences” (1979: 74). Th e theories and 
ideas transmitted by symbols belong to “world 3”.
Although it is tempting to see world 2 as bridging worlds 1 and 3 – those numbers 
certainly invite such a reading – that temptation must be resisted. To see world 3 as an 
outgrowth of conscious experience would be to consider rational entailments as rooted 
in psychology. Like Peirce, Popper rejects psychologism, and thus makes it clear that 
“there is a sense in which world 3 is autonomous: in this world we can make theoretical 
discoveries in a similar way to that in which we can make geographical discoveries in 
world 1” (Popper 1979: 74). World 3 is thus closer to Plato’s realm of Forms: “We can 
discover new problems in world 3 which were there before they were discovered and 
before they ever became conscious; that is, before anything corresponding to them 
appeared in world 2” (Popper 1979: 74). If one wants to learn something about world 
3, one should not study the physical brain (which is in world 1) or the mind (which is 
in world 2). Rather, one has to engage with the abstract items that populate world 3. 
Hence, “it is impossible to interpret either the third world as a mere expression of the 
second, or the second as the mere refl ection of the third” (Popper 1979: 149).
Th e point of Popper’s numeral labels, then, is not to indicate an ordinal arrangement, 
but to underscore the cardinal distinctness of the three worlds. Th is is diff erent from 
Peirce’s categories, where what is “First” logically comes fi rst.
When Popper promoted his world 3, he was pitting himself against the arid 
materialist ontologies of logical positivism. Logical positivists appealed to basic 
sentences (like “I am seeing a red patch at location x and time y”) as a way of “directly 
reporting the ultimate justifi catory basis in fi rst-person experience of the (objective 
and third-person) empirical claims of science” (Livingston 2013: 80). Scientifi c theories 
are indeed corroborated by joint observation, but such joint conduct is achieved/
coordinated by means of signs. Positivists helped themselves to signs, but they never 
fully acknowledged their existence. Th ey thus failed to notice that triangulating a 
correct referent can work only if utterances convey/carry some kind of meaning 
beyond mere sounds and gestures.
Giving the brain, the mind, and ideas “worlds” of their own was Popper’s way of 
rectifying this. Th is strategy was somewhat crude, but I nevertheless think Popper 
should be praised for trying to accommodate what I and others (e.g., Baker 1987: 
134–148) regard as the most formidable objection to eliminativism: one must defend the 
reality, not just of an ontology, but of whatever the defence of that ontology presupposes/
utilizes. In craft ing my trinitarian metaphysics, I will adhere to this slogan (which we 
should make into a bumper sticker).
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4. The modal principle governing semiosis
For Popper, the ideal entities of world 3 are never allowed to migrate to world 1. 
Likewise, the material things of world 1 cannot leap into the unextended domain of 
world 3. None of these segregations hold in my trinitarianism, where the three parts 
of the sign can be switched around. If one were to postulate that the basic constituents 
of reality are “Up”, “Down”, “Left ” and “Right”, this would not allow one to grab 
something and declare, once and for all, that it is, say, “a Left  thing”. I believe that we 
ought to regard the parts of the sign as real, but not in this crude way. So, if we want 
to get a fi rm handle on semiosis, modal logic provides a far better key.
C. I. Lewis, one of the founders of modal logic (Lewis, Langford 1959[1932]), was 
charged with cataloguing the Peirce manuscripts at Harvard (see Pietarinen 2006: 
53). I think that, while rummaging through those papers, Lewis caught a glimpse of 
a trinitarian ontology. Following this lead, I think we should see semiosis as governed 
by a modal principle or axiom:14 necessity entails actuality entails possibility (we can 
picture the subsumption like Russian dolls nested in each other).
Th is principle, which I will use as my keystone, is both elegant and untendentious. 
If something is necessarily the case, then we can infer that it is actually the case (e.g., 
if it is true that humans must die, then clearly humans do die). Likewise, if something 
is actually the case, then we can infer that it was possible in the fi rst place (e.g., if it is 
true that humans do die, then clearly humans can die). However, there is an asymmetry 
in what can be inferred (e.g., the fact that a vase can break does not mean that it does 
or must break).
Peirce (CP 2.382) obviously did not live to read the work of Lewis, but Peirce was 
familiar with the treatment of these modalities in medieval logic (Knuuttila 1993). 
Th e standard idea of necessity might clash with fallibilism (see Houser 2006), so it 
might be wise to demote necessity to generality.15 In any event, I suggest that modal 
asymmetry is the core principle governing meaning and being alike. Consider this 
my main thesis.
Th is can be given a robust treatment. Indeed, Peirce’s theory tracks whether a 
sign-vehicle could, does, or tends to exist. Answers to that question in turn constrain 
whether such a sign-vehicle could, is, or tends to be related to an object. Finally, 
answers to that question constrain whether such a relation could, is, or tends to be 
interpreted. We can illustrate these layered constraints as follows:
14 An axiom is a proposition not subject to further demonstration or proof. Ideally, a well-
chosen axiom would have to be relied on in any attempt to refute it.
15 Th is would make the inference of P from generally-that-P probable, not deductively valid.
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Table 1. Th ree layered trichotomies 
Th is is the famous “1903 classifi cation” (laid out in Peirce 1998: 289–299).16 In keeping 
with my suggestion that semiotics makes a good metaphysics, I do not think “being” is 
so elusive that it slips past this fi ne net of meaning (I also think that collective inquiry 
into the sign would undergo a major growth spurt if it required demonstrable mastery 
of Table 1 as a minimum professional competence).
16 Like the movie character Forrest Gump, who was a gift ed runner but did not know when 
to stop, Peirce also draft ed his cryptic “1908 classifi cation” (reconstructed in Borges 2014; 
with comparisons in Farias, Queiroz 2003). In my judgement, Peirce’s three interpretants 
(‘immediate’, ‘dynamic’ and ‘fi nal’) go over the same terrain covered by the rheme, dicisign, 
and argument. Likewise, his two objects (‘immediate’ and ‘dynamic’) recapitulate the dyadic 
encounter we fi nd in the index. Some scholars (e.g., Atkin 2008) explore all the subsequent 
distinctions, but I am here focusing on what I take to be Peirce’s peak fl oruit.
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Th e table makes room for all sorts of signs. Th omas Sebeok (1979: 64) called 
ecumenicalism the “distinctive burden” of semiotics. Elimination is the cardinal sin 
of such a research programme. Indeed, “if semiotics is the science of signs, as the 
etymology of the word suggests, then it does not exclude any sign. If, in the variety 
of the systems of signs, one discovers systems that diff er from others by their specifi c 
properties, one can place them in a special class without removing them from the 
general science of signs” (Jakobson, Pomorska 1983; quoted in Sebeok 1991: 77). One 
is of course free to study a codifi ed sign system like language aft er having adopted such 
a wide vantage, but one will then do so with a renewed understanding that renders 
less mysterious where the human mind and its cultural products fi t in the grander 
scheme of things. Th at is what metaphysical accounts are for.
Th e layers in Table 1 can be discerned, but they are not “distinct” in the way that, 
say, rock collections or kitchen utensils are. For one thing, the attempt to confi rm the 
presence of a quality or event without triggering any kind of interpretation would be 
tantamount to “asking a fl ashlight in a dark room to search around for something 
that does not have any light shining upon it” (Jaynes 2000[1976]: 23). As a result, we 
can arrive at such distinctions only by means of a “formal” distinction. A formal 
distinction, also called a prescissive abstraction, is performed “by imagining ourselves 
in situations in which certain elements of fact cannot be ascertained” (CP 2.428). It 
thus lies between a “distinction of reason” and a “real distinction”. A distinction of 
reason “is completely dependent upon the mind” (Jordan 1984: 44), whereas “things 
are really distinct if they are separable, that is, if they can exist one without the other” 
(Jordan 1984: 45). We can only wedge formal distinctions into semiosis.
Th us, if we start from the top-most trichotomy of Table 1 and percolate downward 
in accordance with what the modal asymmetries permit, we can discern ten signs (see 
Peirce 1998: 294–296):
10. Type / symbol / argument
9. Type / symbol / dicisign
8. Type / symbol / rheme
7. Type / index / dicisign
6. Type / index / rheme
5. Type / icon / rheme
4. Token / index / dicisign
3. Token / index / rheme
2. Token / icon / rheme
1. Tone / icon / rheme
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Like the periodic table of elements, Peircean semiotics ranks signs using a basic 
model (i.e., the triadic sign) and a principled criterion (i.e., the modal axiom).17 Th is 
tracks varying degrees of complexity and simplicity. Th e most complex sign is the 
argument – a recognizable type that has been assigned a conventional meaning which, 
once understood, compels the production of a further symbol. Everything prior to this 
is meant to give a foundational account of where such inferences fi t in the world.18 Let us 
now look at the bookends of this spectrum, as well as the causal sign located mid-way.
5. A look at salient examples
In his defi nition of the sign, Peirce (1998: 272–273) does not say that a sign is a thing 
that stands to a second thing in a way capable of determining a third thing. Th ings can 
certainly assume those roles; in fact, I have mainly used these as my examples (neurons, 
squids, people, and books). However, taking full-fl edged things as our baseline would 
be somewhat careless, since what oft en matters in semiosis is only an aspect of a thing.
To count as a “thing”, a thing must have a contour of some sort that distinguishes 
it from its surroundings. According to Peirce’s analysis, this would already bring into 
play a relation: “Here is a glass object. [...] Th ere is however something no part of which 
is altogether glass and no part altogether air. It is glass-air. Th is is the surface between 
the glass and the air” (Peirce in press). Clearly, Peirce saw the world diff erently than 
most of us.19 In any event, since it turns out on careful scrutiny that a relation is present 
in any contour, we can decompose a bounded quality even further. For instance,
If I perceive a French tricolor, I perceive a rectangle made of three horizontal 
stripes, of red, white, and blue. Th is involves experiences of those individual 
stripes. Th ere seems a good sense in which I could have had the experience I had 
of any of those stripes without having the experiences of the others. (Shoemaker 
2003: 65)
We can make a “real distinction” by cutting out the white portion of the fl ag with 
scissors, but only a “formal distinction” truly allows us to arrive at a lone white tone. 
17 For more on chemistry and Peircean semiotics, see Tursman 1989: 453.
18 As Tuomas Tahko (2008: 225) explains, usually, “[t]he relevant candidates for the grounds 
of logic include language, grammar and reality”. I would say that my trinitarian ontology 
grounds logic in reality (while construing that reality in such a way that includes grammar and 
language).
19 I think that, by letting us zoom-in on giant colours meeting in a crisp line, modern painters 
like Barnett Newman have tried to call our attention to this feature (which naturally goes 
unnoticed in our practical dealings with things).
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Deleting all relations means deleting all contrasts and comparisons. So, once there, 
there is no telling which fl ag it might be a part of.
Such an unrelated qualitative state is not (and could never be) encountered in actual 
experience, so it is, as Peirce (1998: 294) says, “a mere logical possibility”. Still, studying 
the most barren situation conceivable helps us “ascertain what must be true of signs 
in order for them to embody meaning” (Liszka 1996: 10). Considered in isolation, the 
only interpretant that a lone quality like yellow could produce would be, also, yellow. 
Being the same, such a quality cannot be diff erentiated into numerically distinct parts. 
Still, like a city planner drawing lines on the ground before any buildings are actually 
erected, we can take any quality and draw what could be called a “pre-division”:
    
Figure 1. Th e tone / icon / rheme
Th is is the paradigm case of modal potentiality, since all the parts of this sign could 
happen.
Looking at this radically impoverished situation, Gérard Deledalle (2000: 15) points 
out that there is nothing we can say. Th at is true. However, few have noticed that, in 
its own bizarre way, Figure 1 satisfi es the strict defi nition of the sign proposed by 
Peirce (1998: 272–273):
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation 
to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Th ird, called its 
Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands 
itself to the same Object. 
If a yellow interpretant were produced, this Th ird yellow (noted as “3” in Figure 1) 
would stand in the same relation to the Second yellow that the First yellow stood.20 Th e 
20 It is fruitful to consider that, if a yellow neuron were to somehow turn another neuron 
yellow (and so on), this conveyance of colour would allow the neurons to accomplish the same 
function(s) that they currently fulfi l in the brain. Ned Block once suggested that the qualities 
of consciousness “might be like the water in a hydraulic computer”, such that, despite their 
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triadic relay would be sustained by a shared quality. Even though the tone is a tranquil 
qualitative expanse not disturbed by the ripples of diff erence, its iconic potential sows 
the seed of all subsequent sign-action, since “[n]o sooner have we thought it that it 
becomes interpretable. Th is interpretation involves, in any case, the entire relational 
system, which is in some sense ‘already there’” (Balat 1990; my translation, M.C.).
As my careful use of the subjunctive mood indicates, there are no relations in 
Figure 1. Making room for a pre-actual sign may seem strange,21 but even in a science 
like chemistry, the notion of valence tracks which particles an atom could connect 
with – without saying whether the atom in question does (or ever will) have that 
connection. Likewise, semiotic theory assigns a placeholder for any interpretation, 
called a “rheme” (for the etymology, see Peirce 1998: 285). Th e Routledge Companion 
to Semiotics defi nes the rheme as “representing a qualitative possibility of some sort 
rather than a fact of the matter or a reason” (Cobley 2010: 307).22 Th e rheme is not 
eradicated by the arrival of something concrete. On the contrary, when a quality is 
interpreted, this event delivers proof that the quality could be interpreted.
Countenancing sign 1 may seem superfl uous, but it matters a great deal when we 
try to do justice to real-life cases such as “My (yellow) canary looks like that (yellow) 
banana”:
Th e important idea is this: If any two objects X and Y are similar in some respect, 
then X should possess that “respect” all on its own. Hence, were Y to vanish, X 
would retain the feature that made a comparison by similarity possible. Obviously, 
this applies to Y too. Yet, when we focus only on the relevant quality, we make 
ourselves unable to ascertain whether it is X or Y that is the quality’s bearer. 
Hence, at the proper level of analysis, whatever makes Y and X similar to each 
other is indiff erent to where it is found. (Champagne 2015b: 37)
Of course, a canary and a banana might resemble each other in virtue of another 
shared feature, say, a common shape. Th is just shows how important it is to properly 
pinpoint the relevant aspect responsible for a given “standing for” relation. Corrective 
feedback is crucial to confi rming whether one has discerned the right feature, but there 
is no hope of eventual success if abstract disregard cannot cut through clutter. Hence, 
if a semiotic theory does not allow one to prescissively isolate yellow in its “pre-thing” 
apparent epiphenomenal status, “one should not conclude that the water in the hydraulic 
system does nothing” (Block 1995: 229; see the discussion in Champagne 2009a: 177).
21 For an account of Peirce’s progression towards this view, see Fisch 1986: 184–200, as well as 
Almeder 1973: 7–13.
22 Peirce sometimes described the rhematic interpretant as “[t]hat which remains of a 
Proposition aft er removal of its Subject” (CP 2.95), but this terminology hides just how general 
the notion is (for a similar point, see Stjernfelt 2014: 76).
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status, such a theory will reduce the similarity-based passage from the canary to the 
banana to a causal pairing of tokens, and thereby miss the shared quality that truly 
let one thing stand for the other (see Champagne 2014b).
Now, compare the fi rst sign with the actuality of the fourth sign:
Figure 2. Th e token / index / dicisign
Th is is the paradigm case of modal actuality, since all the parts of this sign do happen. 
Sign 4 is favoured by many, because all its parts are observable. I have inserted the 
term “nearby” in Figure 2, because “[p]erception signs are [...] always spatially bound, 
and, since they take place in a certain sequence, they are also temporally bound” 
(Uexküll 2010[1934]: 54). If sound waves aff ect my ear drum and cause me to leap in 
surprise, the event has generated an actual interpretant. It is the triadic relation that 
renders such a cluster of events signifi cant. A dicisign (from the Latin ‘dicibile’) is an 
interpretant that actually “says” or “asserts” something.23 From this point onward, 
the dividing lines are no longer dotted, even though “[t]alking about the relationship 
between discrete causal facts implies that one abstracts from a continuous process of 
causation” (Hulswit 2001: 342).
Now, compare sign four with the most sophisticated sign:
Figure 3. Th e type / symbol / argument
23 For an in-depth study of the dicisign, see Stjernfelt 2014.
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Th is is the paradigm case of modal generality, since all the parts of this sign tend to 
happen. Consider for example the valid inferential pattern modus tollens: “If P then 
Q / not-Q // Th erefore not-P”. Th e sign-vehicle used to convey this argument has to 
be general enough not to be bound to any particular token instance. Th at type will 
need to have some coded link to its object. Finally, the symbolic notation will have to 
be so arranged that, in its own way, it will compel a specifi c interpretant. In a modus 
tollens, if one knows what “If P then Q” means and one knows what “not-Q” means, 
then one ought to also know “not-P”. In other words, given the conjunction of certain 
symbols, further symbols follow. In this way, “strong arguments and good reasons 
spread with an agency that is in a way independent from the agency of those who 
disseminate them” (Nöth 2014a: 176). Th is passage from premise to conclusion is not 
mechanical, so it is better described as a tendency to conclude.
It would be hasty to assume that signs like the argument are found only among 
humans. A famous story by the ancient thinker Chrysippus24 tells of a chasing dog 
that arrived at a three-tined fork in the road, smelled two paths, then chased its 
quarry down the remaining path – without fi rst checking if that option had a scent. 
Assuming that this anecdote is true, we could reconstruct the canine behaviour as an 
inference: “P or Q or R / not-P / not-Q // Th erefore R”.25 Th e trichotomies of table 1 
inform us that, to count as an argument, verdicts about the smelled paths must survive 
a momentary detachment from their site of origin (otherwise a constant return to the 
previous path would be needed). Moreover, the dog would have to make the same 
inference in the same circumstances. Confi rming this would require testing (like 
switching around which path is smelled last). Yet, if such generality is confi rmed, 
I see no reason why we should refuse to acknowledge that inferential semiosis 
is at play.26
Th e fi rst sign does not imply the fourth sign, and the fourth sign does not imply 
the tenth sign.27 However, in the reverse direction, this independence does not hold. 
If, for example, one cannot bring the two premises in indexical proximity with each 
other, then there is no hope of eventually drawing an inference (let alone a correct 
one). Th is requirement applies equally to dogs and humans. For the canine inference 
24 Th e story is recorded in Book 1, Chapter 14, of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
25 Naturally, this is a symbolic reconstruction. Still, like Pietarinen 2010, I see no reason why 
logical thinking could not operate in a non-visual medium (see Champagne 2015c).
26 In contrast with the classroom student of logic, what Chrysippus’ dog lacks is an ability 
to meta-refl ect on (and thus defend and correct) its inferences (see Brandom 2009). Th is is 
suffi  cient to ensure that an “abyss” separates humans and non-human animals (see Chien 2006: 
75). Even so, we should not expect the distinctions of semiosis to map neatly onto natural kinds 
(as in Kull 2009).
27 My presentation of three straightforward examples has skipped over the intermediary signs 
that lie between them. For reliable expositions of the left -overs, see Liszka 1996: 43–52, Peirce 
1998: 294–296, and Savan 1987: 1–14.
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to take place, the smell has to actually be there. Moreover, the olfactory quality will 
have to be either present or absent, not both. It is this qualitative tenacity that renders 
all logical inference possible:
Any object, A, cannot be blue and not blue at once. It can be blue and hard, because 
blueness and hardness are not thought of as joined in quale-consciousness, one 
appealing to one experiment and the other to another. But A cannot be blue and 
yellow, because these would blend and so the color would cease to be blue or 
yellow either. Th us, the positive truth in the principle of contradiction is that 
quale-consciousness has but one element. (CP 6.231)
It is only because some contents (like the middle term of the syllogism) are shared 
by premises that those premises can be linked. In addition to his pioneering work in 
modal logic, C. I. Lewis (1956[1929]) was one of the fi rst philosophers on record to 
discuss “qualia” (Livingston 2004: 6–8) – a synonym of “tone” also coined by Peirce 
(1998: 272). Appropriately enough, valid inferences like deduction are oft en said to be 
“monotonic” – literally “of one tone”. Th us, in an elegant loop, it is the static nature 
of sign 1 that enables the distinctive rational motion of sign 10 (see Champagne in 
press a).
6. An ascending or descending order?
I have just worked from sign 1 to sign 10, but when I introduced those ten signs 
in the fourth section, I ranked them using a descending order. Th is is no accident. 
Frederik Stjernfelt recently noticed that, later in his studies, Peirce felt it best to “begin 
with the most complicated (or complete) sign type, that of the Argument, eff ectively 
inverting one of the lists given” (Stjernfelt 2014: 92 fn34). Th is may seem minor – 
Stjernfelt confi nes his observation to a footnote only – but I think we should make 
a big deal of the inversion, because it pre-empts major pitfalls. Let me fl ag a few 
of these.
First of all, sign 10 can be confi rmed in everyday experience, whereas the bare 
quality of sign 1 is an ideal limit case that can be arrived at only via an artifi cial 
disregard of what is, in point of fact, complex. If we really uphold this ban on all 
relations, we risk getting stuck, because the lone quality we obtain leaves us no way to 
return to any kind of meaningful phenomenon. Th e ability to contemplate unrelated 
qualities and events thus allows humans to “form the idea of phenomena that we 
do not know how to detect” (Nagel 1986: 24). Th e tone/icon/rheme may be where 
prescissive analysis bottoms out, but starting with sign 1 would be a non-starter. So, 
if we are going to use modal layering to understand semiosis, we should be aware of 
this danger. To put it in terms recently used by Terrence Deacon (2014), “sign analysis” 
is feasible, but “sign development” is not.
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Deacon thinks he can go in both directions. Putting that to the test, I would like 
to sit Deacon in front of a huge yellow screen and ask him how, with just that yellow, 
he can manage to conjure something else. Clearly, on those terms, he cannot. Deacon 
(2014: 95) may boast that his take on the ten-fold taxonomy is “the only viable path 
toward a semiotic cognitive science”, but an account that purports to go from sign 1 to 
sign 10 with ascending arrows (see the image in Deacon 2014: 98) is surely in trouble 
if it cannot even make it past its fi rst step.28
Deacon (2014: 103) says that “the irreducible process-nature of semiosis is most 
clearly exemplifi ed by a comparison with inference”. I agree. In fact, the very word 
“semiosis” comes from an ancient text by Philodemus (1978) dealing with the methods 
of inference.29 Let me therefore use some basic inferences to show why Deacon’s 
developmental account cannot work.
One of the most uncontroversial inferences in all of logic is called “simplifi cation”, 
and it has the following generic form: “P and Q // Th erefore P”. From that complex 
premise – which, naturally, can comprise more than two conjuncts – we can draw 
a simpler conclusion, but we are not rationally entitled to do this: “P // Th erefore P 
and Q”. Because the sign has discernable parts, there is a way for us to infer this: 
“Interpretant and object and sign-vehicle // Th erefore sign-vehicle”. Of course, when 
we isolate, say, the interpretant, we tend not to run into problems, because this part is 
defi ned in a way that reminds us of its association with an object and sign-vehicle.30 
However, if we use the simplifi cation inference to isolate a sign-vehicle, nothing in 
this “First” part obliges us to see it as participating in a greater triad.
Figure 1 may license the uninformative repetition inference “Yellow // Th erefore 
Yellow”, but it certainly does not license more signifi cant inferential linkages like 
“Yellow // Th erefore Banana” or “Yellow // Th erefore Coward”. Th e moral is not that a 
colour cannot stand for fruits or character fl aws – it certainly can.31 Th e moral is that 
we cannot generate any sign-action from just a sign-vehicle. All the justifi ed hoopla 
about triadic relations stems from this fact.
28 Deacon has apparently been gripped by this picture for a while now, since as early as a 1976 
student paper he claimed that “signs can be progressively constructed from simpler forms” 
(“Semiotics and cybernetics: Th e relevance of C. S. Peirce”, quoted in Favareau 2010: 541).
29 For the historical context and relevance of that work, see De Lacy 1938 and Manetti 2002. 
Peirce knew of this text (CP 2.761), which is where he got the term ‘semiosis’ (CP 5.484).
30 Deacon may sometimes do his “very best to absolutely minimize Peircean terminology 
[...]” (quoted in Favareau 2010: 542), but it is rather hard to forget that there are other parts 
when one uses a term like “Th ird” (which is a motivated piece of jargon).
31 Using the useful models proposed by Eco (1986: 34) and Manetti (2010), we can embed a 
quality in an implication to obtain a symptomatic semiosis such as “If Yellow, then Banana / 
Yellow // Th erefore Banana”. Or again, we can embed that quality in an equation to obtain a 
coded semiosis such as “Coward is Yellow / Yellow // Th erefore Coward”. However, with only 
“Yellow”, there is nothing else to conclude.
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If, looking only at a huge yellow screen, a developmental proponent like Deacon 
conjures up something else, it is only by violating the technical defi nition of Firstness 
that he asked us to adopt. It is true that, by cataloguing modal layers, logic “is bound, 
by its very nature, to push its research into the manner of reality itself” (W 2.165). 
Th at said, those modal distinctions will not allow one to deduce any kind of world 
history. Th ere was never a great “iconic period” in the same way that there was, say, 
a “Jurassic period”.
Like Deacon (1997), Peirce was sometimes tempted to think that his categories 
somehow captured a grand evolutionary process.32 Yet, unlike Deacon, Peirce realized 
that literally nothing can “happen” with sign 1. Peirce thus had to invoke questionable 
forces to get his armchair cosmogony started. His reasoning can presumably be 
reconstructed as follows: since we cannot infer complexity from simplicity, and since 
complexity exists, this shows that “growth comes only from love” (Peirce 1992: 354). It 
is not hard to trace what inspires Peirce’s account: “Th e Christian doctrine of creation 
achieves this by grounding the concept of creation ex nihilo in the Trinitarian love of 
God” (Robinson 2010: 251). I want to distance myself from all this.
Discussions of Peircean metaphysics usually focus on his cosmological forces 
(Reynolds 2002), but I am interested only in the idea of a “metaphysics that recognizes 
all the categories” (Peirce 1998: 180).33 How is “Growth only comes from love” a more 
plausible conclusion to draw than “Growth is only an illusion” or “Growth only comes 
from mischief”? Th e whole line of reasoning strikes me as fantastic. Th e passage from 
simplicity to complexity is not “growth”. If it were, I could spontaneously “grow” a new 
hand by considering only my right hand – then zooming out to consider both hands. 
Hence, according to my secular trinitarianism, complexity does not “emerge” – we just 
let it re-enter the scene once we tire of its prescissive exclusion. Explicit metaphysical 
refl ection should never eclipse the fact that “the world is always ‘already there’ before 
refl ection begins [...]” (Merleau-Ponty 1974[1945]: vii). 
Most of the time, the modal asymmetry kept Peirce moving in the right direction.34 
But since there were lapses, I want to be clear that my metaphysics involves logical 
subsumption, not magical saltation.
As I said, sign 10 can be confi rmed in everyday experience. So, if we have to order 
the ten signs in an ascending or descending order, the argument is a better place to 
32 For a good discussion, see Pape 2014.
33 My approach is thus closer to Forest 2007: 734 than to Santaella 2009: 262–263.
34 Interestingly, Peirce never said that “signs grow”, only that symbols grow (see CP 2.302). 
Th is nuance (observed by Deely 2009a: 27) is in agreement with the idea, captured in Table 1, 
that a minimum level of structural complexity and modal generality must be present. For 
a good analysis of this topic hindered by a misleading title, see Nöth 2014a: 177–178; the 
misleading title is rectifi ed in Nöth 2014b. Although I do not want to invite or sanction appeals 
to authority, I fi nd it interesting that some renditions of the biblical cosmogony say “In the 
beginning was the Word” – i.e., a symbol.
544 Marc Champagne
start, since anyone having read this far will have confi rmed its reality by performing 
a host of illative movements. Indeed, when a metaphysician or lay person purports 
to know the world, he/she purports to know, and in so doing takes a stand “in the 
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (Sellars 
1991[1963]: 169). Even so, I want to stress that “[t]he verbal argument is at most only 
stage setting; the heart of the drama is the invocation of experience and, indeed, the 
attempt to register accurately the felt force of relevant experience” (Colapietro 2010: 11).
Whether or not non-discursive layers deserve ontological recognition is a matter 
for each to assess.35 We needn’t, however, let that assessment rest merely on intuition 
or private insight. Rather, I think we can exploit Table 1’s lower-right corner (the 
argument) to artifi cially strip away relations and glean a host of signs that are simpler. 
Wedging formal distinctions into semiosis gives us, not an ontology of relations (Bains 
2006), but an ontology of relations and relata.
So, whereas some philosophies hold that “Th e limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world” (Wittgenstein 2002[1921]: 149; emphasis in original), my account 
signifi cantly extends the range. Indeed, the whole point of trinitarianism’s triple 
commitment is that one gets lone qualities (Champagne 2015b), their contrasts with 
each other (Champagne 2014a), and the plethora of more or less cohesive patterns – 
linguistic or otherwise – that ensue (Champagne 2013a). A metaphysical outlook 
could hardly be more inclusive.
7. Interpretation does not go “all the way down”
I am presenting trinitarianism as a fi nished product. Peirce, however, did not always have 
this layered outlook at his disposal. His intellectual journey began with the realization 
that “[w]e have no power of thinking without signs” (Peirce 1992: 30). Th is can have 
idealistic implications but, according to Peirce, “[n]othing can be more completely false 
than that we can experience only our own ideas” (CP 6.95). Of course, pronouncements 
like these do nothing to show why/how realism holds. So, unlike some of his current 
defenders (e.g., Misak 2013), Peirce was always sensitive to “one of idealism’s most basic 
cautions: if one is to insist that there is existence outside of knowledge, then one should 
have the intellectual rigour of not attributing intelligibility to that existence, for this is, 
aft er all, what ‘outside of knowledge’ implies” (Petrov 2013: 413).
In order not to turn mind-independence into a self-defeating notion, Peirce 
elaborated a layered taxonomy that could acknowledge both the reality of our 
35 Sellars ([1991]1963: 127–196) and his followers (e.g., Brandom 2009) may dismiss all the 
signs below sign 9 or 10 as the “myth of the Given”, but I think that, on the contrary, the 
brutality of signs like the token/index/dicisign can, like a sharp slap in the face, wake us from 
such academic myths (see Champagne 2015a).
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interpretations and of a world that exists apart from those interpretations (Parker 
1994). Aided by the three modalities, we can see that intelligibility (in Petrov’s sense) 
means “being understandable”, which can be prescissively distinguished from “being 
understood” (or “having to be understood”). Surely it is not incredible to say that, 
when we open a refrigerator door to survey its contents, the arrangement we fi nd 
inside made some sense prior to our organizing gaze.36 Formal distinctions thus allow 
us to grant the reality of Firstness and Secondness, while assigning them a proper 
place inside Th irdness (Peirce 1998: 179–195).37 We may sometimes err in our quest 
to understand reality, but we do not confabulate, whole cloth.
Th e world, being intelligible, begins to look like a giant jigsaw puzzle, where 
interpretants supply the fi nal pieces to pre-existing outlines that fi t. “It seems a strange 
thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to 
supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact 
that the entire universe [...] is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively 
of signs” (Peirce 1998: 394). Th is view, sometimes referred to as ‘pansemiotism’,38 
is arguably one of Peirce’s most challenging ideas. Historically though, sign-based 
metaphysics are not without precedent; they were found, for example, during the 
Renaissance (Westerhoff  2001). When Galileo said that the book of nature is written 
in the language of mathematics, he was, implicitly, making the world into a landscape 
of signs to be interpreted.
Scientifi c inquiry naturally attempts to draw a line between, say, meteorological 
forecasts and omens from mutton bowels. Th is division, however, is a fallible 
accomplishment that proceeds from an environment fi lled with mystery. On the 
trinitarian ontology I recommend, it is to this backdrop that we must (re)turn in order 
to test claims. Familial habit and inherited biology may give inquirers a considerable 
head start, but aft er that, there are no (or few39) guarantees. Indeed, if facts and fi ctions, 
36 Th e modal asymmetry I have defended is crucial here. A blatant violation of this “one-way” 
principle was committed by John Poinsot when he claimed that “it suffi  ces to be a sign virtually 
in order to signify in act” (2013[1632]: 126). For a glimpse of the many confusions that this can 
generate, see Champagne (2013b: 286 fn5).
37 James Johnston (2012: 18) recently expressed doubts about accessing reality through 
Th irdness. However, if one truly understands what it means to be a “Th ird”, a worry like this 
should not arise. Aft er all, on pain of contradiction, how can one believe in the existence of 
the number three yet doubt the existence of the number two or one? Discursive intelligibility 
ceases below three-place relations, but it takes a logocentric enthymeme to see this cessation as 
eradicating being itself. For more on ineff ability, see Champagne 2014a.
38 For an early offi  cial use of the term, see Nöth 1995: 81.
39 I agree with Machan (1980) that, philosophically, we can discern a handful of axioms that 
cannot be denied on pain of being accepted. For more on what those might be, see Champagne 
2006. Th e rationalist aspiration of spinning all reality out of such simple certitudes is, however, 
hopeless.
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truths and lies, all present themselves as “equally objective within our experience, then 
the sorting out of which-is-which is a problem rather than a given” (Deely 2004: 35).
As I explained in Section 5, ‘thing’ is not a primitive category for Peirce. His sign-
based ontology thus challenges the commonplace view of the world as “made out 
of ultimate little things and collisions amongst them” (Ladyman et al. 2007: 23). A 
Peirce scholar like John Boler (1963: 162) may write that his “major complaint against 
[Peirce’s] categories is that I fi nd in them no place for things”, but a semiotic ontology 
spares one the trauma that materialists must feel whenever paradigm shift s redefi ne 
their favourite stuff .40
Now, there may be good objections to sign-based ontologies but, at present, one fi nds 
mostly bad objections in the literature. Th e worst reason is to provide no reason at all. 
Guido Ipsen (2008: 21) is unfortunately correct when he reports that “[p]ansemiotism 
has […] almost become an accusation close to an insult”. Th ere have been attempts to 
restore civility and solubility to the debates (Champagne 2009b; Champagne 2013b; 
Rodríguez Higuera 2015), but now this article has added an important distinction: 
‘pansemiotism”, taken literally, is the view that reality is made of triadic signs; whereas 
‘trinitarianism”, as I have presented it, is the view that reality is made of signs and all 
that such triads presuppose.
I favour the latter view, but I leave it to exegetes to decide which is closest to Peirce. 
However, some critics have claimed that, in the Peircean worldview, “it’s interpretation 
all the way down” (Barbieri 2013: 283). It is unclear what that even means, or why it 
should count as a reproach. At any rate, the fact that two-thirds of the categories – 
and six-tenths of the ensuing taxonomy – are devoted to cataloguing uninterpreted 
phenomena should suffi  ce to establish that, in Peircean semiotics, interpretation does 
not go “all the way down”.
7. Conclusion
Any semiotician who has asked “What is a sign?” has doubled as a metaphysician. 
C. S. Peirce, who was unconcerned with policing the boundaries of disciplines, 
suggested that signs might be a fundamental ontological ingredient. In an eff ort to 
render this suggestion more robust, I have argued that modal asymmetry governs 
meaning and being alike. We can use the (generality(actuality(possibility))) sub-
sumption to obtain a full technical breakdown – from inchoate feelings to notational 
systems regimented with military precision.
40 Some philosophers of science (e.g., Ladyman et al. 2007) have argued that the best theories 
in current physics do away with the idea of ‘things’ altogether. Th ere is no consensus on how 
best to view a post-thing world, but interesting proposals have been made (see Ross 2000, 
discussed in Champagne 2013a).
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As we master this layered account, the idea of positing three “worlds” begins to 
seem rather simplistic. Alas, Popper-like misconceptions persist, so I have tried to clear 
a few of these along the way: semiosis is not scale-relative, it does not provide any kind 
of world history, it does not necessarily map onto natural kinds, it does not involve 
magical saltation, and interpretation does not go all the way down. In light of these 
exclusions, one might wonder what a trinitarian ontology is good for. Well, quite a lot, 
on my telling: it makes room for anything a semiotician might experience, and thus 
anything a semiotician might want to study – given their personal research interest(s).
Of course, this inclusive worldview can take some getting used to. But, if my 
layered account can make a sign-based ontology look more plausible/palatable, I will 
consider that progress.41
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Менее упрощающая метафизика: пирсовская многоуровневая 
теория значения как многоуровневая теория бытия
Статья основана на многообещающем проекте Ч. С. Пирса об инклюзивной точке зрения, 
которая придает реальность его трем категориям. Уходя от обычного фокусирования на 
спорных космологических силах, я использую модальный принцип, чтобы разделить 
различные онтологические слои: регулярное знаковое действие (sign-action, например: 
закодированный язык) включает фактическое действие знака (например: события здесь 
и сейчас), в которое, в свою очередь, включается возможное действие знака (например: 
качества, связанные с тем, что может быть подобно им). Как только мы понимаем, что 
все компоненты триадического знака участвуют в этом асимметричном подчинении 
(subsumption), мы получаем средства для отслеживания, на каком уровне сложности в 
каждом данном случае происходит семиозис. Так как большая часть такой “триадичной” 
метафизики была бы посвящена одобрению неинтерпретируемых явлений, берусь 
утверждать, что нынешние сомнения по поводу основанных на знаках онтологий 
несостоятельны.
Vähem lihtsustav metafüüsika: Peirce’i mitmetasandiline 
tähendusteooria kui mitmetasandiline olemisteooria
Artikkel lähtub Peirce’i paljutõotavast plaanist inklusiivse vaatenurga jaoks, mis muudab 
reaalseks tema kolm kategooriat. Liikudes eemale tavalisest keskendumisest (vaieldavatele) 
kosmoloogilistele jõududele kasutan modaalsusprintsiipi, et hoida lahus erinevaid ontoloogilisi 
kihistusi. Regulaarne märgitegevus (nt kodeeritud keel) viib enda alla tegeliku märgitegevuse (nt 
sündmused siin ja praegu), mis omakorda võtab endasse võimaliku märgitegevuse (nt omadused, 
mis on seotud ükskõik millega, mis võib nende sarnaseks osutuda). Kui kord mõistame, et 
kolmetise märgi komponendid on kõik vastutavad selle asümmeetrilise alistamise ees, saame 
vahendid jälgimaks, millisel keerukustasandil semioos igal antud juhul asub. Et suurem osa 
sellisest “kolmetisest” metafüüsikast oleks pühendatud tõlgendamata nähtuste heakskiitmisele,, 
väidan, et praegused kahtlused märgipõhiste ontoloogiate suhtes on suuresti põhjendamatud.
COMMENT: 
Semiotics is not metaphysics
Jean-Marie Chevalier42
Marc Champagne’s paper off ers an opportunity to take a quick look at how metaphysical 
categories relate to semiotics. Most metaphysical systems build upon a few elementary 
42 Author’s address: Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Yliopistonkatu 4, 
00100 Helsinki, Finland; e-mail: jeanmariechevalier@yahoo.fr.
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categories. Charles Peirce developed a three-category worldview based on the mere sequence 
of one, two and three. Paul Weiss, one of the posthumous editors of his works, claimed that 
the world is made of actuality, ideality, existence and God. More recently, E. J. Lowe’s four-
category ontology included objects, kinds, attributes, and modes. Kant’s twelve and Aristotle’s 
ten categories refer more ambiguously to both the world and our understanding or language. 
Rather than on the number or labels of the categories, it may be worth focusing on the method 
which ascertains their discovery.
How did Peirce justify the thesis that there are three categories in the world? He made 
it clear that he did not suff er from triadomany (CP 1.568, 1910), and tried “to pooh-pooh 
and refute” any ontological classifi cation into three terms (CP 8.328, 1904), which was 
nevertheless supported by demonstrations. Which ones? Peirce used a variety of methods, 
such as transcendental deduction, prescisive abstraction, the logic of relations, phaneroscopy, 
mathematics, empirical confi rmation, diagrammatic construction, etc. Many trichotomies 
pervade Peirce’s philosophy: three categories, three modalities, three basic arities and three 
valences, three functions of the sign, three kinds of signs in relation to their objects, etc. It is not 
enough to superimpose them and notice that everything works in three. For the conceptions 
to stay dynamical and not crystallize into a dead body of doctrines, one must understand the 
deep relations (or their absence) between those various triads. 
Following Legg 2013,43 Champagne’s idea of the method seems to be that a metaphysical 
outlook can be derived from semantics – not from language, but from “sign-action”. Th e aim 
is to capture some of “what there is”. Let us try to clarify the project. 
Th ere are at least two ways of understanding “metaphysics”. Th e fi rst is (1) ontology 
approximately in the Quinean sense of what there is, namely, the entities postulated by a 
theory. Th is is roughly the sense used in computer science to refer to a descriptive model 
consisting of a set of types, properties and relations. Th e other sense is (2) the study of the real 
constituents of the world (actual and possible: time, matter, properties, relations, events, etc.). 
It seems to me that Champagne’s use is closer to meaning (1). Signs are obviously not 
constituents of the world like giraff es and stones, nor even like space, possibilities, or forms. 
Th ey might be the same kind of things as actions, or as meanings, or as tropes, but it is far 
from certain, and it is not what Champagne argues (it would probably take a lengthy treatise 
to give a proof that signs are real in this sense). 
What he seems to tell us is that he intends to take for granted that signs have a kind of 
objectivity in our ontology (the one we decide to adopt). It shows in particular in the slogan 
that will decorate the bumpers of his cars: “one must defend the reality, not just of an ontology, 
but of whatever the defence of that ontology presupposes/utilizes.” It implies that there may be 
various ontologies, and that “an ontology” does not describe everything there is – otherwise 
it would make no sense to defend extra realities presupposed by the totality of what there is. 
Ontology (or metaphysics) is used in this weak sense: a set of elements on which to build a 
43 Cathy Legg seems to argue that a full-fl edged metaphysics does not have to apologize for 
mixing up semantics and metaphysics, as long as their semantics include indexical reference 
(realism about particulars), symbolic reference (realism about conventions), and iconic 
reference (realism about logical forms). If I understand it properly, I do not see how the fact 
that our language (or theoretical models) uses structures and conventions and not only indices 
to individuals proves that these structures and conventions are real entities in the world. 
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model. Otherwise, I do not see why “[a]ny semiotician who has asked ‘What is a sign?’ has 
doubled as a metaphysician”. Th e defi nitional question applied to signs is not about a “to ti 
esti”, an essence, but about how signs work. Asking how to use the oven does not turn you 
into a metaphysician.
Th e nature of the objective reality of such an ontology is carefully described: signs have 
a functional articulation. [Th e author decided to “replace the lay term ‘sign’ by the more 
appropriate term ‘sign-vehicle’ to pick out a material thing based on the semiotic role it plays”. I 
rather regard ‘sign-vehicle’ as a non-Peircean phrase which Morris used to convey an inadequate 
view, to which one would like to reply with Peirce: “How can anybody write so who knows the 
technical meaning of vehicle?” (W 8.232.)] What Champagne (unhappily, to my mind44) calls 
the “parts” of the signs are the elements that combine together into a semiotic functioning: a 
token (‘representamen’) refers (conventionally, causally, or through its properties) to an object 
for a third (‘interpretant’). Notice it does so in a certain respect (‘ground’). Th ese functional 
roles of course are not met in nature: you cannot count the interpretants like the chairs or the 
interpreters in a room. 
Th at they are functions implies that they do not need to be actually triggered to possess 
their functional potentialities. Th at is why I would not recommend saying that: “At minimum, 
then, interpretation demands that something happen.” For Champagne, at least “a quick glance 
in the direction of the text” is needed for this text to signify. To the contrary, Peirce insisted 
against this verifi cationist and behaviourist (so to speak – Peirce obviously did not have the 
word) interpretation. “Of course, nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign,” wrote Peirce 
(CP 2.308, 1900). Even more: the conscious recognition of a sign “may come very near action. 
Th e muscles may twitch and we may restrain ourselves only by considering that the proper 
occasion has not arisen. But, in general, we virtually resolve upon a certain occasion to act as 
if certain imagined circumstances were perceived” (CP 2.435, 1893). However, if conscious 
interpretation requires such a kind of “quasi-action”, it does not entail that signs require 
consciousness to be interpreted. Assuming the contrary would perpetuate the confl ation of 
the interpretant on the interpreter. For example, a buried text in a forgotten language does not 
lose its meaning when the last speaker dies. And an index is defi ned as a representamen which 
will continue to fulfi ll its function of a representamen “just the same whether it be interpreted 
as a representamen or not” (CP 5.73, 1903).
What Champagne probably alludes to is a diff erent idea: not that interpretation requires an 
action, but that it produces an action, that is, that it always produces an energetic interpretant 
as its output. As Peirce wrote: “When a sign determines an interpretation of itself in another 
sign, it produces an eff ect external to itself, a physical eff ect” (CP 8.191, 1904). But even 
there, the eff ect is primarily potential: there always is a possible situation in which the tested 
interpretation would result in a determinate action.
Now, Champagne also wants to “explore the Peirce-inspired idea that reality is comprised 
of three stuff s: lone quality, causal impacts between two things, and triadic relations”. Th ose 
roughly correspond to Peirce’s metaphysical (‘Cenopythagorean’) categories – now in the 
44 In a private communication, Francesco Bellucci suggested that a sign can have its object as 
“part” when the sign is a proposition and can have its interpretant as “part” when the sign is an 
argument. In the absence of any clarifi cation about the parts of a sign, I would suggest being 
cautious with this phrase. 
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second sense of metaphysics: the ultimate components of reality. One cannot postulate a priori 
equivalence between representamen, object, interpretant and ground (notice that there are 
four elements involved in the functioning of a sign) on the one hand, and qualities, impacts 
and triadic relations on the other. It would not make sense to say for instance that icons (which 
by the way cannot be identifi ed with qualities: none of the hypoicons defi ned by Peirce is a 
quality, “pure” or not) are plain signs without objects nor interpretants, that indices are signs 
with objects, and that a symbol has both an object and an interpretant. 
To be true, it could be argued that icons do not present explicitly their objects and 
interpretants, and indices do not present explicitly their interpretants. Th ere are a few texts 
in which Peirce tried to elaborate in such a direction, but they rely on deeper justifi cations. 
Here is one attempt of his: 
Th is explains why there should be three classes of signs; for there is a triple 
connection of sign, thing signifi ed, cognition produced in the mind. Th ere may 
be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing signifi ed; in that case 
the sign is an icon. Or there may be a direct physical connection; in that case, 
the sign is an index. Or there may be a relation which consists in the fact that the 
mind associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a name. (W5.245)
Yet in all three types of signs (icon, index, symbol), all the relations between object, 
representamen and interpretant circulate. It is the diff erent natures of these relations which 
defi ne the kinds of signs, not these relations being instantiated or not.
It is true that Peirce himself related his three categories to his trichotomic classifi cation of 
signs. But, fi rstly, he spent his whole life proving the relation and never took it for granted at 
fi rst. And secondly, the classifi cation of signs is not a classifi cation of the parts of the sign – its 
functional elements –, but of the various kinds of signifi cation there may be. In particular, 
icon, index and symbol roughly match Firstness, Secondness and Th irdness. 
So, the three parts of a sign are not the three fundamental kinds of signs – which, by the 
way, are ten. When Champagne defi nes his “trinitarian ontology” as the thesis that “everything 
is made of one or more of the sign’s three parts”, it is very dissimilar to Peirce’s idea that 
everything is made of one or more of the three categories. As for being made of icons, indices 
and symbols, it does not seem to be the kind of entities reality can be “made of” (a giraff e, 
a thought, a colour are not composed of kinds of signs – instead, Peirce claimed, they are 
composed of fi rsts, seconds and thirds).
For this reason, I do not see how it might be argued that “Peirce’s categories of First, Second, 
and Th ird are meant to track the role-switching that allows information to be passed along 
in this relay race” from interpretants to signs. Interpretants (resp. grounds, objects, etc.) are 
not fi rsts rather than seconds or thirds. In this respect, the “suggestion that semiotics makes a 
good metaphysics” looks hasty. Th e relationship between semiotics and metaphysics probably 
requires some more refi ned work than a mere arbitrary superimposition.45
45 One might fi nd that the author has a tendency to make diffi  culties disappear a bit too easily 
behind a few sleights of hand and metaphors like the following, which gave me a hard time: 
“Like rubber-bands layered atop one another until they form a ball-shape, signs can be added 
to signs even though the inner-most rubber band that started it all is coiled unto nothing but 
itself ”. 
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Peirce was particularly aware that such careful work had to be done, since he devoted 
most of his lifetime to it. He might not have agreed with the epigraph on Champagne’s paper 
suggesting that one should rely on Aristotle’s following axiom: no diff erence should be made 
between modes of signifying and modes of being. Th e quote goes on saying that Aristotle was 
“perhaps nearer the truth” than erroneous modern logical analyses of modality (CP 2.384, 
1900). It by no means signifi es that Peirce himself would take ordinary grammar as a guide 
for metaphysics. It took him many developments to build a speculative grammar as only part 
of a whole system of logic on which to rely. I do not think that the following formula is clear 
enough to provide any insight in that direction: “[…] my trinitarian ontology grounds logic 
in reality (while construing that reality in such a way that includes grammar and language)”.
Champagne correctly emphasizes that signs are not things: they are roles assumed by 
things or aspects, sounds, ideas, etc. Th e comparison with ‘Up’, ‘Down’, ‘Left ’ and ‘Right’ is 
perfectly apt: just like there are no ‘Left  things’, there are no ‘interpretants’ in a metaphysical 
sense. To be an interpretant, an object, a ground or a representamen has to assume a functional 
role in a defi nite context, not to be a certain stuff . But if this is true, how could we derive a 
metaphysics from these relative roles? 
Th us, aft er carefully explaining that signs are not things, Champagne seems to onfl ate 
them. He writes what I take no reader of Peirce would admit, namely that “Peirce suggested 
that signs might be a fundamental ontological ingredient”. A diff erence he wants to make 
with Popper’s view is that the latter defi ned three hermetic worlds, whereas “the three 
parts of the sign can be switched around”. But Popper does metaphysics in sense (2), and 
Champagne in sense 1. In other words, the fact that a giraff e will never be a conception or a 
pure meaning does not preclude it from being held today as an object and tomorrow as a sign. 
Popper is “semiotic compatible”;46 his notion of three worlds was directly inspired by Frege – 
who himself took his “dritte Reich” from Gomperz (see Popper 1978: 157)47 – and possibly 
by Peirce too: contrary to what the author (relying on Chauviré) states, Popper had probably 
read Peirce as early as in the 1950s at least.48 
46 Relying on Pietarinen 2006, the author also contends that Popper misinterpreted Peirce 
since in the latter’s works the mind-body problem would not be raised. I disagree, and refer 
to Peirce’s explicit examination of parallelism, his “molecular theory of protoplasm” and his 
theory of matter as eff ete mind. See among other references W 4.45; W 4.163; W 6.188; W 
6.292–3; W 6.391; CP 6.238, 1892; CP 6.264, 1892; CP 6.272, 1893; MS 961, 1892; MS 962; EP 
2.23, 1895.
47 Popper, Karl 1978. Th ree Worlds. Th e Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 143–167, was 
accessed at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/p/popper80.pdf.
48 Freeman and Skolimowski 1974 suggest that Popper discovered Peirce’s philosophy with 
the appearance of W. B. Gallie’s 1952 Peirce and Pragmatism. Popper 1957 plainly elaborates 
on Peirce’s theory of propensities. Ivor Grattan-Guinness, who was Popper’s student in the 
1960s, said in a private communication that Popper had bought Peirce’s Collected Papers 
when they were issued (which could mean the early 1930s as well as the late 1950s), quickly 
went through them, and gave them away to a student of his. As early as 1936, Popper was 
acquainted with Charles Morris. For suppositions on Peirce’s indirect infl uence on Popper, see 
Niiniluoto 1984.
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I skip other points of disagreement49 to keep focusing on Champagne’s main point. His 
main claim, he states, is about the “modal principle governing semiosis”: “necessity entails 
actuality entails possibility”. Th is is supposed to be the keystone of trinitarianism. One of its 
strong points, Champagne assumes, is that it is “untendentious”. I would go further and say 
that it is obviously true. It does not properly require any “modal logic” to be proved, because 
it is included in the defi nitions of possible, actual and necessary. I do not see any need to refer 
to C. I. Lewis for it, although Lewis did use much of the Peircean material, because the (almost 
unchallengeable) fact that there are only two logical modalities (possibility and necessity) plus 
existence has nothing to do with semiotics nor with any of Peirce’s discovery. Th at Lewis’s 
modal logic was Peirce-inspired does not in any case prove that semiotics relies on modalities 
nor that “trinitarian ontology” allows for a modal proof.
En passant, I take it to be a major fl aw to substitute ‘general’ for ‘necessary’. Generality 
belongs to the category of quantity, not modality. Most of the time a general proposition is by no 
means a modal proposition; generality might be possible, contingent or necessary. Th e reason 
for Champagne’s move is the view that there would be incompatibility between fallibilism and 
necessity. But there is none: we can for instance hold false mathematical beliefs, while at the 
same time mathematical truths are necessarily true (Haack 1979). As far as I understand it, 
Houser (2006) does not express any such need to “demote necessity into generality”.
Th ere are three modalities. Th ere also are four tips to the square of oppositions, and fi ve 
fi ngers at each hand. It is true that the modalities have the advantage of referring to both 
language and reality. In this sense, Champagne is right to assume that “modal asymmetry 
governs meaning and being alike”, or at least applies to them alike. Th at there might be any 
correspondence to semiotic functions or classifi cations remains to be proven. Peirce did not 
assume without demonstration that the three modes of being (possible quality, existence, law) 
match the modalities of possibility, actuality and necessity. 
One could also “antecedently expect” modes of being to be three on the basis of the 
Cenopythagorean categories, “[b]ut a little examination will show us that they could be brought 
into fairly presentable accordance with the theory that there were only two, or even only one. 
Th e question cannot be decided in that way” (CP 2.116, 1902). A fortiori, the fact that there 
are three modalities, and their defi nitions, cannot serve as “a principled criterion” for ranking 
signs – or why not rank cows and pronominal verbs according to such a criterion as well? 
I will not expose Peirce’s many painful, sometimes tedious attempts at making a connection 
between signs and modalities. But it would be much too precipitant to conclude for instance 
49 Here are only three. First, I doubt that the physical absence of the object communicated 
results necessarily in error or fi ction. “An icon is a representamen which fulfi lls the function of 
a representamen by virtue of a character which it possesses in itself, and would possess just the 
same though its object did not exist” (CP 5.73, 1903). Peirce oft en insisted that a word – which 
does not have a “physical presence” – may change the world. Second, I disagree that analytic 
philosophers reduce in absentia discourse to acquaintance. To the contrary, the whole point of 
Russell’s theory of defi nite description was to account for the meaning of propositions whose 
terms could not be known by acquaintance. Last, I do not see any demonstration for dismissing 
reductionism apart from a reference to Ross; and although I am not fond of these terms, I take 
‘sociosemiotics’ not to be defi ned by the size of its objects but by their social character, just like 
‘quantumsemiotics’ would bear on objects behaving according to non-Newtonian laws. 
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that an icon can be interpreted, an index is interpreted, and a symbol must be interpreted. No 
more is it likely that icons may exist, indices do exist and symbols must exist – which would 
not make much sense anyway, since it would imply that symbols also do exist, or that some 
icons do exist (since they may), blurring the whole distinction. 
So when Champagne argues that contrary to Peirce’s, “[his] metaphysics involves logical 
subsumption, not magical saltation”, I would recommend considering more closely Peirce’s 
minute eff orts to vindicate every link of his parallel semiotic and metaphysical constructions. 
Th at they mirror one another is not obvious, though. Peirce was most careful: “I will only say 
that the subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained [by hypostatic abstraction] 
must not be confounded with the diff erent Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or 
Freedom from Destiny)” (CP 4.549, 1906).
Champagne’s recipe just requires us to “wedge formal distinctions into semiosis” and 
“percolate downward in accordance with what the modal asymmetries permit”. And thus, 
Peirce’s classifi cation of signs does obtain. Isn’t it magical? Once Peirce did the work of fi nding 
out a whole cogent system, we indeed can play with it, fold and unfold its various branches 
and rejoice that everything works soundly. But what’s the point? 
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